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1 Introduction
Studying the impact of government spending on macroeconomic outcomes is one of the
most celebrated policy exercises within the neoclassical growth model: it is important for
understanding the business-cycle implications of fiscal policy, the macroeconomic effects of
wars, and the cross-section of countries. Some classics include Hall (1980), Barro (1981,
1989), Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Braun and
McGrattan (1993), and McGrattan and Ohanian (1999, 2006).
These studies have all maintained the convenient assumption of complete markets, ab-
stracting from the possibility that agents’ saving and investment decisions, and hence their
reaction to changes in fiscal policy, may crucially depend on the extent of risk sharing within
the economy. This paper contributes towards filling this gap. It revisits the macroeconomic
effects of government consumption within an incomplete-markets variant of the neoclassical
growth model.
The key deviation we make from the standard paradigm is the introduction of uninsur-
able idiosyncratic risk in production and investment. All other ingredients of our model are
the same as in the canonical neoclassical growth model: firms operate neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale technologies, households have standard CRRA/CEIS preferences, and mar-
kets are competitive.
The focus on idiosyncratic production/investment risk is motivated by two considerations.
First, this friction is empirically relevant. This is obvious for less developed economies. But
even in the United States, privately-owned firms account for nearly half of aggregate produc-
tion and employment. Furthermore, the typical investor—the median rich household—holds
a very undiversified portfolio, more than one half of which is allocated to private equity.1
And second, as our paper shows, this friction upsets some key predictions of the standard
neoclassical paradigm.
1See Quadrini (2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Carroll (2000), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002). Also note that idiosyncratic investment risks need not be limited to private entrepreneurs; they may
also affect educational and occupational choices, or the investment decisions that CEO’s make on behalf of
public corporations. On this latter point, see Panousi and Papanikolaou (2008) for some supportive evidence.
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In the standard paradigm, the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio, productivity
(output per work hour), the wage rate, and the interest rate, are all pinned down by the
equality of the marginal product of capital with the discount rate in preferences. As a result,
any change in the level of government consumption, even if it is permanent, has no effect on
the long-run values of these variables.2 On the other hand, because higher consumption for
the government means lower net-of-taxes wealth for the households, a permanent increase in
government consumption raises labor supply. It follows that employment and, by implication,
output and investment increase. But the long-run levels of capital intensity and productivity
unchanged.
The picture is quite different once we allow for incomplete markets. The same wealth
effect that, in response to an increase in government consumption, stimulates labor supply in
the standard paradigm, now also discourages investment. This is simply because risk taking,
and hence investment, is sensitive to wealth. We thus find very different long-run effects.
First, a permanent increase in government consumption necessarily reduces the risk-free
interest rate. And second, unless the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low enough,
it also reduces the capital-labor ratio, productivity, and wages.
The effect on the risk-free rate is an implication of the precautionary motive: a higher
level of consumption for the government implies a lower aggregate level of wealth for the
households, which is possible in steady state only with a lower interest rate. If investment
was risk-free, a lower interest rate would immediately translate to a higher capital-labor ratio.
But this is not the case in our model precisely because market incompleteness introduces a
wedge between the risk-free rate and the marginal product of capital—this wedge is simply
the risk premium on investment. Furthermore, because of diminishing absolute risk aversion,
this wedge is higher the lower the wealth of the households. It follows that the negative wealth
effect of higher government consumption raises the risk premium on investment and can
thereby lead to a reduction in the capital-labor ratio, despite the reduction in the interest
rate. We show that a sufficient condition for this to be the case is that the elasticity of
2This, of course, presumes that the change in government consumption is financed with lump-sum taxes.
The efficiency or redistributive considerations behind optimal taxation are beyond the scope of this paper.
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intertemporal substitution is sufficiently high relative to the income share of capital—a
condition easily satisfied for plausible calibrations of the model.
Turning to employment and output, there are two opposing effects. On the one hand,
as with complete markets, the negative wealth effect on labor supply contributes towards
higher employment and output. On the other hand, unlike complete markets, the reduction
in capital intensity, productivity, and wages contributes towards lower employment and
output. Depending on the income and wage elasticities of labor supply, either of the two
effects can dominate.
The deviation from the standard paradigm is significant, not only qualitatively, but also
quantitatively. For our preferred parametrizations of the model, the following hold. First, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is comfortably above the critical value that suffices for
an increase in government consumption to reduce the long-run levels of the capital-labor ratio,
productivity, and wages. Second, a 1% increase in government spending under incomplete
markets has the same impact on capital intensity and labor productivity as a 0.5% − 0.6%
increase in capital-income taxation under complete markets. Third, these effects mitigate,
but do not fully offset, the wealth effect on labor supply. Finally, the welfare consequences
are non-trivial: the welfare cost of a permanent 1% increase in government consumption is
three times larger under incomplete markets than under complete markets.
The main contribution of the paper is thus to highlight how wealth effects on investment
due to financial frictions can significantly modify the supply-side channel of fiscal policy.
In our model, these wealth effects emerge from idiosyncratic risk along with diminishing
absolute risk aversion; in other models, they could emerge from borrowing constraints. Also,
such wealth effects are relevant for both neoclassical and Keynesian models. In this paper we
follow the neoclassical tradition because this clarifies best our contribution: whereas wealth
effects have been central to the neoclassical approach with regard to labor supply, they have
been mute with regard to investment.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the macroeconomic effects
of government consumption in an incomplete-markets version of the neoclassical growth
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paradigm that allows for uninsurable investment risk. A related, but different, exercise is
conducted in Heathcote (2005) and Challe and Ragot (2007). These papers study deviations
from Ricardian equivalence in Bewley-type models like Aiyagari’s (1994), where borrowing
constraints limit the ability of agents to smooth consumption intertemporally. In our paper,
instead, deviations from Ricardian equivalence are not an issue: our model allows households
to freely trade a riskless bond, thus ensuring that the timing of taxes and the level of debt
has no effect on allocations, and instead focuses on wealth effects on investment due to
incomplete risk sharing.
The particular framework we employ in this paper is a continuous-time variant of the
one introduced in Angeletos (2007). That paper showed how idiosyncratic capital-income
risk can be accommodated within the neoclassical growth model without loss of tractability,
studied the impact of this risk on aggregate saving, and contrasted it with the impact of
labor-income risk in Bewley-type models (Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1997; Krusell and Smith,
1998). Other papers that introduce idiosyncratic investment or entrepreneurial risk in the
neoclassical growth model include Angeletos and Calvet (2005, 2006), Buera and Shin (2007),
Caggeti and De Nardi (2006), Covas (2006), and Meh and Quadrini (2006).3 The novelty of
our paper is to study the implications for fiscal policy in such an environment.
Panousi (2008) studies the macroeconomic effects of capital taxation within a similar
environment as ours. That paper shows that, when agents face idiosyncratic investment
risk, an increase in capital taxation may paradoxically stimulate more investment in general
equilibrium. This provides yet another example of how the introduction of idiosyncratic
investment risk can upset some important results of the neoclassical growth model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, which
fixes labor supply so as to focus on the most novel results of the paper. Section 3 characterizes
its equilibrium and Section 4 analyzes its steady state. Section 5 examines the steady-state
effects of government consumption on the interest rate and capital accumulation. Section
6 considers three extensions that endogenize labor supply. Section 7 examines the dynamic
3Related are also the earlier contributions by Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), Obstfeld (1994), and Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (1997).
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response of the economy to a permanent change in government consumption. Section 8
concludes. All the formal results are explained in the main text; but the complete proofs are
delegated to the Online Appendix.
2 The basic model
Time is continuous, indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). There is a continuum of infinitely-lived house-
holds, indexed by i and distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Each household is endowed with
one unit of labor, which it supplies inelastically in a competitive labor market. Each house-
hold also owns and runs a firm, which employs labor in the competitive labor market but can
only use the capital stock invested by the particular household.4 Households cannot invest
in other households’ firms and cannot otherwise diversify away from the shocks hitting their
firms, but can freely trade a riskless bond. Finally, all uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic,
and hence all aggregates are deterministic.
2.1 Households, firms, and idiosyncratic risk
The financial wealth of household i, denoted by xit, is the sum of its holdings in private
capital, kit, and the riskless bond, bit:
xit = k
i
t + b
i
t. (1)
The evolution of xit is given by the household budget:
dxit = dpi
i
t + [Rtb
i
t + ωt − Tt − cit]dt, (2)
4One can think of a household as a couple, with the wife running the family business and the husband
working in the competitive labor market (or vice versa). The key assumption, of course, is only that the
value of the labor endowment of each household is pinned down by the competitive wage, and is not subject
to idiosyncratic risk.
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where dpiit is the household’s capital income (i.e., the profits it enjoys from the private firm
it owns), Rt is the interest rate on the riskless bond, ωt is the wage rate, Tt is the lump-sum
tax, and cit is the household’s consumption. Finally, the familiar no-Ponzi game condition is
also imposed.
Whereas the sequences of prices and taxes are deterministic (due to the absence of ag-
gregate risk), firm profits, and hence household capital income, are subject to undiversified
idiosyncratic risk. In particular:
dpiit = [F (k
i
t, n
i
t)− ωtnit − δkit]dt+ σkitdzit. (3)
Here, nit is the amount of labor the firm hires in the competitive labor market, F is a
constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical production function, and δ is the mean depreciation
rate. Idiosyncratic risk is introduced through dzit, a standard Wiener process that is i.i.d.
across agents and across time. This can be interpreted either as a stochastic depreciation
shock or as a stochastic productivity shock, the key element being that it generates risk
in the return to capital. The scalar σ measures the amount of undiversified idiosyncratic
risk and can be viewed as an index of market incompleteness, with higher σ corresponding
to a lower degree of risk sharing (and σ = 0 corresponding to complete markets). Finally,
without serious loss of generality, we assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the technology:
F (k, n) = kαn1−α, with α ∈ (0, 1).5
Turning to preferences, we assume an Epstein-Zin specification with constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (CEIS) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Given a
consumption process, the utility process is defined by the solution to the following integral
equation:
Ut = Et
∫ ∞
t
z(cs, Us) ds, (4)
5The characterization of equilibrium and the proof of the existence of the steady state extend to any
neoclassical production function; it is only the proof of the uniqueness of the steady state that uses the
Cobb-Douglas specification.
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where
z(c, U) ≡ β
1− 1/θ
[
c1−1/θ
((1− γ)U)−1/θ+γ1−γ
− (1− γ)U
]
. (5)
Here, β > 0 is the discount rate, γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and θ > 0
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.6
Standard expected utility is nested with γ = 1/θ. We find it useful to allow θ 6= 1/γ in
order to clarify that the qualitative properties of the steady state depend crucially on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution rather than the coefficient of relative risk aversion
(which in turn also guides our preferred parameterizations of the model). However, none of
our results rely on allowing θ 6= 1/γ. A reader who feels uncomfortable with the Epstein-Zin
specification can therefore ignore it, assume instead standard expected utility, and simply
replace γ with 1/θ (or vice versa) in all the formulas that follow.
2.2 Government
The government consumes output at the rate Gt. Government spending is deterministic, it
is financed with lump-sum taxation, and it does not affect either the household’s utility from
private consumption or the production of the economy. The government budget constraint
is given by:
dBgt = [RtB
g
t + Tt −Gt]dt, (6)
where Bgt denotes the level of government assets (i.e., minus the level of government debt).
Finally, a no-Ponzi game condition is imposed to rule out explosive debt accumulation.
2.3 Aggregates and equilibrium definition
The initial position of the economy is given by the cross-sectional distribution of (ki0, bi0).
Households choose plans {cit, nit, kit, bit}t∈[0,∞), contingent on the history of their idiosyncratic
shocks, and given the price sequence and the government policy, so as to maximize their
6To make sure that (4) defines a preference ordering over consumption lotteries, one must establish
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the integral equation (4); see Duffie and Epstein (1992).
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lifetime utility. Idiosyncratic risk, however, washes out in the aggregate. We thus define
an equilibrium as a deterministic sequence of prices {ωt, Rt}t∈[0,∞), policies {Gt, Tt}t∈[0,∞),
and macroeconomic variables {Ct, Kt, Yt}t∈[0,∞), along with a collection of individual con-
tingent plans ({cit, nit, kit, bit}t∈[0,∞))i∈[0,1], such that the following conditions hold: (i) given
the sequences of prices and policies, the plans are optimal for the households; (ii) the labor
market clears,
∫
t
nit = 1, in all t; (iii) the bond market clears,
∫
i
bit +B
g
t = 0, in all t; (iv) the
government budget is satisfied in all t; and (v) the aggregates are consistent with individual
behavior, Ct =
∫
i
cit, Kt =
∫
i
kit, and Yt =
∫
i
F (kit, n
i
t), in all t. (Throughout, we let
∫
i
denote
the mean in the cross-section of the population.)
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the economy. We first solve for a household’s
optimal plan for given sequences of prices and policies. We then aggregate across households
and derive the general-equilibrium dynamics.
3.1 Individual behavior
Since employment is chosen after the capital stock has been installed and the idiosyncratic
shock has been observed, optimal employment maximizes profits state by state. By constant
returns to scale, optimal firm employment and profits are linear in own capital:
nit = n¯(ωt)k
i
t and dpi
i
t = r¯(ωt)k
i
tdt+ σdz
i
t, (7)
where
n¯(ωt) ≡ arg max
n
[F (1, n)− ωtn] and r¯(ωt) ≡ max
n
[F (1, n)− ωtn]− δ.
Here, r¯t ≡ r¯(ωt) is the household’s expectation of the return to its capital prior to the
realization of the idiosyncratic shock zit, as well as the mean of the realized returns in the
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cross-section of firms. Analogous interpretation applies to n¯t ≡ n¯(ωt).
The key result here is that households face risky, but linear, returns to their capital. To
see how this translates to linearity of wealth in assets, let ht denote the present discounted
value of future labor income net of taxes, a.k.a. human wealth:
ht =
∫ ∞
t
e−
R s
t Rjdj(ωs − Ts)ds. (8)
Next, define effective wealth as the sum of financial and human wealth:
wit ≡ xit + ht = kit + bit + ht. (9)
It follows that the evolution of effective wealth can be described by:
dwit = [r¯tk
i
t +Rt(b
i
t + ht)− cit]dt+ σkitdzit. (10)
The first term on the right-hand side of (10) measures the expected rate of growth in the
household’s effective wealth; the second term captures the impact of idiosyncratic risk.
The linearity of budgets, together with the homotheticity of preferences, ensures that, for
given prices and policies, the household’s consumption-saving problem reduces to a tractable
homothetic problem as in Samuelson’s and Merton’s classic portfolio analysis. It then follows
that the optimal policy rules are linear in wealth, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {ωt, Rt}t∈[0,∞) and {Gt, Tt}t∈[0,∞) be equilibrium price and policy se-
quences. Then, equilibrium consumption, investment and bond holdings for household i are
given by
cit = mtw
i
t, k
i
t = φtw
i
t, and b
i
t = (1− φt)wit − ht, (11)
where φt, the fraction of effective wealth invested in capital, is given by
φt =
r¯t −Rt
γσ2
, (12)
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while mt, the marginal propensity to consume out of effective wealth, satisfies the recursion
m˙t
mt
= mt + (θ − 1)ρt − θβ, (13)
with ρt ≡ φtr¯t + (1− φt)Rt − 12γφ2tσ2 denoting the risk-adjusted return to saving.
Condition (12) simply says that the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is
increasing in the risk premium µt ≡ r¯t−Rt and decreasing in risk aversion γ and the amount
of risk σ. Condition (13) is essentially the Euler condition: it describes the growth rate of
the marginal propensity to consume as a function of the anticipated path of risk-adjusted
returns to saving. Whether higher risk-adjusted returns increase or reduce the marginal
propensity to consume depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To see this
more clearly, note that in steady state this condition reduces to m = θβ − (θ − 1) ρ, so that
higher ρ decreases m if and only if θ > 1; that is, a higher risk-adjusted return to saving
increases the fraction of savings out of effective wealth if and only if the EIS is higher than
one. This is due to the familiar tension between the income and substitution effects implied
by an increase in the rate of return.
3.2 General equilibrium
Because individual consumption, saving and investment are linear in individual wealth, ag-
gregates at any point in time do not depend on the extent of wealth inequality at that time.
As a result, the aggregate equilibrium dynamics can be described with a low-dimensional
recursive system.
Define f(K) ≡ F (K, 1) = Kα as the production function in intensive form (output per
work hour). From Proposition 1, the equilibrium ratio of capital to effective wealth and the
equilibrium risk-adjusted return to savings are identical across agents and can be expressed
as functions of the current capital stock and risk-free rate: φt = φ(Kt, Rt) and ρ = ρ(Kt, Rt),
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where
φ(K,R) ≡ 1
γσ2
(f ′(K)− δ −R) and ρ(K,R) ≡ R + 1
2γσ2
(f ′(K)− δ −R)2 .
Similarly, the wage is given by ωt = ω(Kt), where ω(K) ≡ f(K)− f ′(K)K = (1− α)f(K).
Using these facts, aggregating the policy rules of the agents, and imposing market clearing
for the risk-free bond, we arrive at the following characterization of the general equilibrium
of the economy.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the aggregate dynamics satisfy the following ODE system
K˙t = f (Kt)− δKt − Ct −Gt (14)
C˙t
Ct
= θ (ρt − β) + 12γσ2φ2t (15)
H˙t = RtHt − ωt +Gt (16)
Kt =
φt
1− φtHt (17)
with ωt = ω(Kt), φt = φ(Kt, Rt), and ρt = ρ(Kt, Rt).
This system has a simple interpretation. Condition (14) is the resource constraint
of the economy; it follows from aggregating budgets across all households and the gov-
ernment, imposing labor- and bond-market clearing, and using the linearity of individ-
ual firm employment to individual capital together with constant returns to scale, to get
Yt =
∫
i
F (kit, n
i
t) = F (
∫
i
kit,
∫
i
nit) = F (Kt, 1). Condition (15) is the aggregate Euler con-
dition for the economy; it follows from aggregating consumption and wealth across agents,
together with the optimality condition (13) for the marginal propensity to consume. Condi-
tion (16) expresses the evolution of the present value of aggregate net-of-taxes labor income
in recursive form; it follows from the definition of human wealth combined with the in-
tertemporal government budget, which imposes that the present value of taxes equals the
present value of government consumption. Finally, condition (17) represents market-clearig
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in the bond market; more precisely, it follows from aggregating bond holdings and invest-
ment across agents to get Bt = (1− φt)Wt −Ht and Kt = φtWt, using the latter to replace
Wt in the former, and imposing Bt = 0.
This system characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of the economy under both complete
and incomplete markets. In particular, conditions (14), (16) and (17) are exactly the same
under either market structure; the key differences between complete and incomplete markets
rest in the Euler condition (15) and in the relation between the risk-adjusted return ρt, the
risk-free rate Rt and the marginal product of capital f ′(Kt)− δ.
When σ = 0 (complete markets), arbitrage imposes that Rt = f ′(Kt) − δ = ρt and the
Euler condition reduces to its familiar complete-market version, C˙t
Ct
= θ (Rt − β). When
instead σ > 0 (incomplete markets), there are two important changes. First, the precaution-
ary motive for saving introduces a positive drift in consumption growth, represented by the
term 1
2
γσ2φ2t in the Euler condition (15). And second, the fact that investment is subject
to undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk introduces a wedge between the risk-free rate and the
marginal product of capital, so that Rt < ρt < f ′(Kt) − δ. It is worth noting here that the
first effect is also shared by Aiyagari (1994) and other Bewley-type models that consider
labor-income risk, whereas the second effect relies on the presence of capital-income risk.
Finally note that condition (17) can be solved for Rt as a function of the contempora-
neous (Kt, Ht), so that the equilibrium dynamics of the economy reduce to a simple three-
dimensional ODE system in (Ct, Kt, Ht). Indeed, the equilibrium dynamics can be approxi-
mated with a simple shooting algorithm, similar to the one applied to the complete-markets
neoclassical growth model. For any historically given K0, guess some initial values (C0, H0)
and use conditions (14) − (16) to compute the entire path of (Ct, Kt, Ht) for t ∈ [0, T ], for
some large T ; then iterate on the initial guess till (CT , KT , HT ) is close enough to its steady-
state value.7 In the special case of a unit EIS (θ = 1), we have that mt = β and hence
Ct = β(Kt +Ht) for all t. One can then drop the Euler condition from the dynamic system
and analyze the equilibrium dynamics with a simple phase diagram in the (K,H) space,
7This presumes that a turnpike theorem holds true in our model; we expect this to be the case at least
for σ small enough, by continuity to the complete-markets case.
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much alike in a textbook exposition of the neoclassical growth model. Either way, this is a
significant gain in tractability relative to other incomplete-markets models, where the entire
wealth distribution—an infinite dimensional object—is usually a relevant state variable for
aggregate equilibrium dynamics. As in Angeletos (2007), the key is that individual policy
rules are linear in individual wealth, so that aggregate dynamics are invariant to the wealth
distribution.
4 Steady State
We henceforth parameterize government spending as a fraction g of aggregate output to
study the steady state of the economy, that is, the fixed point of the dynamic system in
Proposition 2. We now show that this can be characterized as the solution to a system of
two equations in K and R.
First, note that the growth rate of consumption must be zero in steady state. Setting
C˙t
Ct
= 0 into the Euler condition (15) gives:
ρ = β − 1
2
γ
θ
σ2φ2. (18)
Using then the facts that ρ = R + 1
2γσ2
(f ′(K)− δ −R)2 and φ = 1
γσ2
(f ′(K)− δ −R), we
can write the above as follows:
f ′(K)− δ −R =
√
2θγσ2 (β −R)
θ + 1
. (19)
This condition gives the combinations of K and R that are consistent with stationarity of
aggregate consumption (equivalently, with stationarity of aggregate wealth).
Second, note that the growth rate of human wealth from (16) must also be zero in steady
state. From this we get that:
H =
ω −G
R
,
which simply states that human wealth must equal the present value of wages net of taxes.
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Substituting this into the bond-market clearing condition (17), and using ω = (1− α)f(K)
and G = gf(K), we get the following:
K =
φ (K,R)
1− φ (K,R)
(1− α− g)f(K)
R
. (20)
This condition gives the combinations of K and R that are consistent with stationarity of
human wealth and bond-market clearing.
In any steady state, the capital stock and the risk-free rate must jointly solve equations
(19) and (20). In the Appendix we further show that a solution to this system exists and is
unique. We thus reach the following result.
Proposition 3. The steady state exists and is unique. The steady-state levels of the capital
stock and the risk-free rate are given by the solution to the system of equations (19) and (20).
To understand the determination of the steady state of our model and its relation to
its complete-markets counterpart, note first that condition (18) imposes ρ < β. That is,
the risk-adjusted return to saving must be lower than the discount rate. In particular, ρ
must be low enough just to offset the precautionary motive for saving. If the risk-adjusted
return were higher than this critical level, consumption (and wealth) would increase over
time without bound, which would be a contradiction of steady state. Conversely, if the
risk-adjusted return were lower than this level, consumption (and wealth) would shrink to
zero, which would once again be a contradiction of steady state. Combining this with the
fact that R < ρ, we infer that the risk-free rate is also lower than the discount rate: R < β.
At the same time, because ρ < f ′(K) − δ, it is unclear whether the marginal product of
capital is higher or lower than the discount rate. Using these observations, along with the
fact that the complete-markets steady state features f ′(K) − δ = R = β, we conclude that
incomplete markets necessarily reduce the risk-free rate but can have an ambiguous effect
on the capital stock. In simple words, the precautionary motive guarantees that the interest
rate is lower under incomplete markets than under complete markets, but this does not
necessarily translate to a higher capital stock, because investment risk introduces a wedge
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Figure 1. A graphical representation of the steady state.
between the marginal product of capital and the interest rate.
A graphical representation of the steady state helps appreciate further this tension be-
tween the precautionary motive and the risk premium in our model (and will also facilitate
the comparative statics of the steady state). Let K1(R) and K2(R) denote the functions
defined by solving, respectively, equations (19) and (20) for K as functions of R. We discuss
the properties of these functions in what follows and illustrate them in Figure 1.8
Consider first the curve K1(R). When σ = 0, condition (19) reduces to f ′(K) − δ = R.
The complete-markets counterpart of K1(R) is therefore given by a standard curve for the
marginal product of capital, represented by curve MPK in Figure 1. The positive risk
premium introduced on investment when σ > 0 implies that curveK1(R) lies uniformly below
curve MPK. Indeed, the distance between the two curves measures the risk premium, as
captured by the right-hand side of (19). Clearly, the latter is decreasing in R: the higher the
risk-free rate, the lower the risk premium in steady state. To understand the intuition behind
this property, take for a moment the interest rate to be exogenously given. Then, an increase
8For a formal derivation of all the properties discussed here, see Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
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in R would lead to an increase in the steady-state level of wealth. Because of diminishing
absolute risk aversion, the increase in wealth would stimulate capital accumulation. However,
because of diminishing returns to capital accumulation, the ratio of capital to wealth, i.e.
the fraction φ, would fall. But then the risk premium, which is given by 1
2
γφ2σ2, would also
fall. And because wealth explodes as R→ β, while K remains bounded, it follows that the
risk premium must vanish as R→ β. These observations explain why the distance between
the two curves indeed falls monotonically with R, and vanishes as R→ β.
To recap, there are two important economic effects behind curve K1(R). On the one
hand, a higher R raises the opportunity cost of capital. This effect, which is present under
both complete and incomplete markets, tends to discourage investment. On the other hand,
a higher R is possible in steady state under incomplete markets only if aggregate wealth
is higher in that steady state. This wealth effect, which is present only under incomplete
markets, tends to encourage investment. Moreover, from condition (19) it is immediate that
K1(R) is U-shaped, as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, the opportunity-cost effect must
be dominating for low R, while the wealth effect must be dominating for high R.9
Let’s now turn to the curve K2(R). The complete-markets counterpart of K2(R) is the
vertical line at R = β: as σ → 0, K2(R) converges to this vertical line, whereas for any
σ > 0, K2(R) lies to the left of this vertical line. In Lemma 1 in the Appendix we show that
K2(R) is monotonically decreasing in R, with K2(R) → +∞ as R → 0 and K2(R) → 0 as
R → β.10 The intuition for the monotonicity of K2(R) is simple. For given K, and hence
given ω, an increase in R reduces both H and φ (K,R) , and thereby necessarily reduces the
right-hand side of (20). But then, for (20) to hold with the lower R, it must be that K also
falls, which explains why K2(R) is decreasing.
Since K1(R) and K2(R) are continuous in R, and using their limiting properties from
above, it is then clear that the two curves intersect at least once at some R ∈ (0, β). But, as
already mentioned, we further show in the Appendix that this intersection is in fact unique.
9We verify these properties in Lemma 1 in the Appendix, where we further show that the relative strength
of these two effects is such that ∂K1/∂R > 0 if and only if θ > φ/(1− φ). This property will also turn out
to be important in the next section, where we analyze the steady-state effects of government spending.
10Simulations suggest that the curve is also convex, but we have not been able to prove this.
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The incomplete-markets steady state of our model is thus represented by point IM in Figure
1, while its complete-markets counterpart is represented by point CM. For the particular
economy we have considered in this figure, the steady-state capital stock is lower under
incomplete markets than under complete markets. However, the opposite could also be
true. Clearly, a sufficient condition for the steady-state capital stock to be lower than under
complete markets is that the two curves intersect on the upward portion of K1(R), or that
the wealth effect on investment due to risk aversion dominates the usual opportunity cost
effect. The following proposition identifies a condition that is both necessary and sufficient
for the capital stock to be lower than under complete markets.
Proposition 4. The steady-state level of capital is lower under incomplete markets (σ > 0)
than under complete markets (σ = 0) if and only if θ > φ
2−φ .
This result, which was first reported in Angeletos (2007), highlights how augmenting the
neoclassical growth model for idiosyncratic capital-income risk can lead to lower aggregate
saving, and thereby to lower aggregate output and consumption than under complete mar-
kets. This result stands in contrast to Aiyagari (1994), which documents how labor-income
risk raises aggregate saving.11 We refer the interested reader to that earlier work for a more
extensive discussion and quantification of this result. In the remainder of our paper, we
focus on the effects of government spending, which is our main question of interest.
5 The long-run effects of government consumption
In this section we study how the steady state changes when the rate of government con-
sumption increases. The analysis will make clear that the different impact that government
spending has in our model as compared to the standard paradigm originates precisely from
the wealth effects that idiosyncratic risk introduces in the demand for investment.
11In Aiyagari (1994), a precautionary motive implies R < β, but the absence of investment risk maintains
R = f ′(K) − δ, from which it is immediate that the capital stock is necessarily higher under incomplete
markets.
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Figure 2. The steady-state effects of government consumption.
5.1 Characterization
To study the long-run effects of an increase in the level of government consumption, we again
use a graphical representation of the steady state, namely Figure 2, which is a variant of
Figure 1.
Let the initial level of government spending be g = glow and suppose that the correspond-
ing steady state is given by point IMlow in Figure 2. Subsequently, let government spending
increase to g = ghigh > glow. Note that condition (19) does not depend on g, and hence an
increase in government consumption does not affect the K1(R) curve. Rather, it is condition
(20), and the K2(R) curve, that depend on g. In particular, because a higher g means lower
net-of-taxes labor income, and hence a lower H in steady state for any given R, an increase in
government consumption causes the K2(R) curve to shift leftwards, as illustrated in Figure
2. This leftward shift is a manifestation of the negative wealth effect of higher lump-sum
taxes on investment.
The new steady state is then represented by point IMhigh. Clearly, the leftward shift in
the K2(R) curve leads unambiguously to a decrease in R. The impact on K, on the other
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hand, is ambiguous. This is because, as explained in the previous section, a reduction in
R entails two opposing effects on the demand for investment: the familiar opportunity-cost
channel tends to encourage investment, while the novel wealth channel of our model tends to
discourage investment. As evident from the figure, if the two curves intersect on the upward
portion of the K1(R) curve, that is, in the portion where the wealth effect dominates, then
the increase in g leads to a reduction in K. In the Appendix we show that the intersection
occurs in the upward portion of the K1(R) curve if and only if θ > φ1−φ . Finally, it is easy
to check that φ < α.12 We thus reach the the following result.
Proposition 5. In steady state, an increase in government consumption (g) necessarily
decreases the risk-free rate (R), while it locally decreases the capital-labor ratio (K/N), labor
productivity (Y/N), the wage rate (ω), and the saving rate (s ≡ δK/Y ) if and only if θ > φ
1−φ .
A sufficient condition for the latter is that θ > α
1−α.
This is the key theoretical result of our paper. It establishes that, as long as the EIS
is sufficiently high relative to the income share of capital, a permanent increase in the rate
of government consumption has a negative long-run effect on both the interest rate and the
capital intensity of the economy.
It is important to appreciate how this result deviates from the standard neoclassical
paradigm. With complete markets, in steady state the interest rate is equal to the discount
rate (R = β), and the capital-labor ratio is determined by the equality of the marginal
product of capital to the discount rate (f ′ (K/N)− δ = β). It follows that, in the long run,
government consumption has no effect on either R or K/N, Y/N, ω, and s. This is true
even when labor supply, N , is endogenous.13 The only difference is that, with endogenous
labor supply, N changes with g. In particular, when labor supply is fixed, the increase
in government consumption simply leads to a one-to-one decrease in private consumption.
When instead labor supply is elastic, the increase in government consumption has a negative
12To see this, note from condition (20) that φ1−φ =
RK
(1−α−g)f(K) . Combining this with the fact that
R < f ′(K)− δ < αf(K)/K, we get φ1−φ < α1−α−g < α1−α and hence φ < α.
13We endogenize labor in Section 6.
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wealth effect, inducing agents to work more. The capital stock then increases one-to-one
with labor supply, so as to keep the the capital-labor ratio and the interest rate invariant
with g.
In our model, instead, government consumption has non-trivial long-run effects on both
the interest rate and the capital intensity of the economy. Building on the earlier discussions,
we can now summarize the key mechanism in our model as follows. Because households face
consumption risk, they have a precautionary motive to save. Because preferences exhibit
diminishing absolute risk aversion, this motive is stronger when the level of wealth is lower.
It follows that, by reducing household wealth, higher government spending stimulates pre-
cautionary saving. But then, the risk-free rate at which aggregate saving can be stationary
has to be lower, which explains why the risk-free rate R falls with g. At the same time,
because of diminishing absolute risk aversion, the reduction in wealth tends to discourage
the demand for investment. Provided that the positive effect of the lower opportunity cost of
investment is not strong enough to offset this negative wealth effect, the capital-labor ratio
K/N also falls with g.
5.2 Calibration and numerical simulation
For empirically plausible calibrations of the model, the critical condition θ > φ
1−φ appears
to be satisfied quite easily. For example, take the interest rate to be R = 4% and labor
income to be 65% of GDP (as in US data). This implies that H is about 16 times GDP.
With a capital-output ratio of 4 (again as in US data), this translates to an H of about 4
times K. Since in steady state φ
1−φ =
K
H
, this exercise gives a calibrated value for φ
1−φ of
about 0.25. This critical value is lower than most of the recent empirical estimates of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which are in most cases above 0.5 and often even
above 1.14 Hence, a negative long-run effect of government consumption on aggregate saving
and productivity appears to be the most likely scenario.
14 See, for example, Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003), Mulligan (2002), and Gruber (2005). See
also Guvenen (2006) and Angeletos (2007) for related discussions on the parametrization of the EIS.
21
In the remainder of this section, we make a first pass at the potential quantitative im-
portance of our results within the context of our baseline model. In the next section we then
turn to an enriched version of the model that allows for endogenous labor supply, as well as
a certain type of agent heterogeneity.
The economy is fully parameterized by (α, β, γ, δ, θ, σ, g), where α is the income share of
capital, β is the discount rate, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ is the (mean)
depreciation rate, θ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σ is the standard deviation
of the rate of return on private investment, and g is the share of government consumption
in aggregate output.
In our baseline parametrization, we take α = 0.36, β = 0.042, and δ = 0.08; these values
are standard in the literature. For risk aversion, we take γ = 5, a value commonly used
in the macro-finance literature to help generate plausible risk premia. For the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, we take θ = 1, a value consistent with recent micro and macro
estimates.15 For the share of government, our baseline value is g = 25% (as in the United
States) and a higher alternative is g = 40% (as in some European countries).
What remains is σ. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of the rate-of-return risk
faced by the “typical” investor in the US economy. However, there are various indications
that investment risks are significant. For instance, the probability that a privately held
firm survives five years after entry is less than 40%. Furthermore, even conditional on
survival, the risks faced by entrepreneurs and private investors appear to be very large:
as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document, not only is there a dramatic cross-
sectional variation in the returns to private equity, but also the volatility of the book value
of a (value-weighted) index of private firms is twice as large as that of the index of public
firms—one more indication that private equity is more risky than public equity. Note then
that the standard deviation of annual returns is about 15% per annum for the entire pool
of public firms; it is over 50% for a single public firm (which gives a measure of firm-specific
risk); and it is about 40% for a portfolio of the smallest public firms (which are likely to be
15See the references in footnote 14.
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similar to large private firms).
Given this suggestive evidence, and lacking any better alternative, we let σ = 30% for
our baseline parameterization and consider σ = 20% and σ = 40% for sensitivity analysis.
Although these numbers are somewhat arbitrary, it is reassuring that the volatility of indi-
vidual consumption generated by our model is comparable to its empirical counterpart. For
instance, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2006) estimate the standard deviation of consumption growth to be about 8%
for stockholders (and about 3% for non-stockholders). Similarly, using data that include
consumption of luxury goods, Aït-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2001) get estimates between
6% and 15%. In our simulations, on the other hand, the standard deviation of individual
consumption growth is less than 5% per annum (along the steady state).
Putting aside these qualifications about the parametrization of σ, we now examine the
quantitative effects of government consumption on the steady state of the economy. Table
1 reports the per-cent reduction in the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio (K/N),
labor productivity (Y/N), and the saving rate (s), relative to what their values would have
been if g were 0.16 Complete markets are indicated by CM and incomplete markets by IM.
K/N Y/N s τ kequiv
CM IM CM IM CM IM CM
baseline 0 −10.02 0 −3.73 0 −1.14 17
σ = 40% 0 −12.18 0 −4.57 0 −1.21 20
σ = 20% 0 −6.78 0 −2.5 0 −0.88 12
g = 40% 0 −17.82 0 −6.82 0 −2.05 28
Table 1. The steady-state effects of government consumption .
In our baseline parametrization, the capital-labor ratio is about 10% lower when g = 25%
than when g = 0. Similarly, productivity is about 4% lower and the saving rate is about
1 percentage point lower. These are significant effects. They are larger (in absolute value)
than the steady-state effects of precautionary saving reported in Aiyagari (1994). They are
16Here, since labor supply is exogenously fixed, the changes in K and Y coincide with those in K/N and
Y/N ; this is not the case in the extensions with endogenous labor supply in the next section.
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equivalent to what would be the steady-state effects of a marginal tax on capital income
equal to 17% in the complete-markets case. (The tax rate on capital income that would
generate the same effects under complete markets is given in the last column of the table,
as τ kequiv.)
Not surprisingly, the effects are smaller if σ is lower (third row) or if γ is lower (not
reported), because then risk matters less. On the other hand, the effects are larger when
g = 40% (final row): productivity is almost 18% lower, the saving rate is 2 percentage points
lower, and the tax on capital income that would have generated the same effects under
complete markets is 28%.
Table 2 turns from level to marginal effects: it reports the change in K/N, Y/N, and s as
we increase government spending by 1 percent, either from 25% to 26%, or from 40% to 41%.
In the first case, productivity falls by 0.19%; in the second, by 0.26%. This is equivalent
to what would have been, under complete markets, the effect of increasing the tax rate on
capital income by about 0.75 percentage points in the first case, and about 0.8 percentage
points in the second case.
K/N Y/N τ kequiv
CM IM CM IM CM
g = 25%→ 26% 0 −0.52 0 −0.19 0.75
g = 40%→ 41% 0 −0.71 0 −0.26 0.8
Table 2. Long-run effects of a permanent 1% increase in government consumption.
6 Endogenous labor
In this section we endogenize labor supply in the economy. We consider three alternative
specifications that achieve this goal without compromising the tractability of the model.
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6.1 GHH preferences
One easy way to accommodate endogenous labor supply in the model is to assume preferences
that rule out income effects on labor supply, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1998).
In particular, suppose that preferences are given by U0 = E0
∫∞
0
e−βtu (ct, lt) dt, with
u (ct, lt) =
1
1−γ [ct + v(lt)]
1−γ , (21)
where lt denotes leisure and v is a strictly concave, strictly increasing function.17 The
analysis can then proceed as in the benchmark model, with labor supply in period t given
by Nt = 1− l (ωt) , where l (ω) ≡ arg maxl {v (l)− ωl} .
This specification highlights an important difference between complete and incomplete
markets with regard to the employment impact of fiscal shocks. Under incomplete markets,
an increase in government spending can have a negative general-equilibrium effect on ag-
gregate employment. This is never possible with complete markets, but it is possible with
incomplete markets when an increase in g reduces the capital-labor ratio, and thereby the
wage rate, which in turn discourages labor supply. Indeed, with GHH preferences, θ > φ
1−φ
suffices for both K/N and N to fall with g in both the short run and the long run.
Although it is unlikely that wealth effects on labor supply are zero in the long run, they
may well be very weak in the short run. In light of our results, one may then expect that
after a positive shock to government consumption both employment and investment could
drop on impact under incomplete markets. Indeed, an interesting extension would be to
consider a preference specification that allows for weak short-run but strong long-run wealth
effects on labor supply, as in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006).
17To allow for θ 6= 1/γ, we let Ut = Et
∫∞
t
z(cτ + v(lτ ), Uτ )dτ, with the function z defined as in condition
(5).
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6.2 KPR preferences
A second tractable way to accommodate endogenous labor supply is to assume that agents
have homothetic preferences over consumption and leisure, as in King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988). The specification assumed in that paper is U0 = E0
∫
e−βtu (ct, lt) dt, with
u(ct, lt) =
(c1−ψt l
ψ
t )
1− γ
1−γ
, (22)
where lt denotes leisure and ψ ∈ (0, 1) is a scalar. This specification imposes expected utility
(θ = γ). To allow for θ 6= 1/γ, we let Ut = Et
∫∞
t
z(cψτ l
1−ψ
τ , Uτ )dτ, with z defined as in (5).
The benefit of this specification is that it is standard in the literature (making our results
comparable to previously reported results), while it also comes with zero cost in tractabil-
ity.18 The homotheticity of the household’s optimization problem is then preserved and the
equilibrium analysis proceeds in a similar fashion as in the benchmark model.19 The only
essential novelty is that aggregate employment is now given by Nt = 1− L (ωt, Ct), where
L (ωt, Ct) =
ψ
1− ψ
Ct
ωt
.
The neoclassical effect of wealth on labor supply is then captured by the negative relationship
between Nt and Ct (for given ωt).
For the quantitative version of this economy, we take ψ = 0.75. This value, which is in
line with King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), ensures
that the steady-state fraction of available time worked approximately matches US data. The
rest of the parameters are as in the baseline specification of the benchmark model.
18For convenience, we allow agents to trade leisure with one another, so that an individual agent can
possibly consume more leisure than her own endowment of time.
19The proofs are available upon request.
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6.3 Hand-to-mouth workers
A third approach is to split the population into two groups. The first group consists of the
households that have been modeled in the benchmark model; we will call this group the
“investors”. The second group consists of households that supply labor but do not hold any
assets, and simply consume their entire labor income at each point in time; we will call this
group the “hand-to-mouth workers”. Their labor supply is given by
Nhtmt = ω
ω
t (C
htm
t )
c , (23)
where Chtmt denotes the consumption of these agents, ω > 0 parameterizes the wage elasticity
of labor supply, and c > 0 parameterizes the wealth elasticity.20
This approach could be justified on its own merit. In the United States, a significant frac-
tion of the population holds no assets, has limited ability to borrow, and sees its consumption
tracking its income almost one-to-one. This fact calls for a richer model of heterogeneity
than our benchmark model. But is unclear what the “right” model for these households
is. Our specification with hand-to-mouth workers is a crude way of capturing this form of
heterogeneity in the model, while preserving tractability.
A side benefit of this approach is that it also gives freedom in parameterizing the wage
and wealth elasticities of labor supply. Whereas the KPR preference specification imposes
ω = −c = 1, the specification introduced above permits us to pick much lower elasticities,
consistent with micro evidence. The point is not to argue which parametrization of the
labor-supply elasticities is more appropriate for quantitative exercises within the neoclassical
growth model; this is the subject of a long debate in the literature, to which we have
nothing to add. The point here is rather to cover a broader spectrum of empirically plausible
quantitative results.
For the quantitative version of this economy, we thus take ω = 0.25 and c = −0.25,
which are in the middle of most micro estimates.21 What then remains is the fraction of
20Preferences that give rise to this labor supply are ut = c
ζc
t − nζnt , for appropriate ζc, ζn.
21See, for example, Hausman (1981), MaCurdy (1981), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
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aggregate income absorbed by hand-to-mouth workers. As mentioned above, a significant
fraction of the US population holds no assets. For example, using data from both the PSID
and the SCF, Guvenen (2006) reports that the lower 80% of the wealth distribution owns
only 12% of aggregate wealth and accounts for about 70% of aggregate consumption. Since
some households may be able to smooth consumption even when their net worth is zero, 70%
is likely to be an upper bound for the fraction of aggregate consumption accounted for by
hand-to-mouth agents. We thus opt to calibrate the economy so that hand-to-mouth agents
account for 50% of aggregate consumption. This is also the value of the relevant parameter
that one would estimate if the model were to match US aggregate consumption data—we
can deduce this from Campbell and Mankiw (1989).22
6.4 The long-run effects of government consumption with endoge-
nous labor
Our main theoretical result (Proposition 5) continues to hold in all of the above variants of
the benchmark model: in steady state, a higher rate g of government consumption necessarily
reduces the interest rateR; and it also reduces the capital-labor ratioK/N, labor productivity
Y/N, and the wage rate ω if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution θ is higher
than φ
1−φ .
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What is not clear anymore is the effect of g on K and Y , because now N is not fixed.
On the one hand, the reduction in wealth stimulates labor supply, thus contributing to an
increase in N . This is the familiar neoclassical effect of government spending on labor supply.
On the other hand, as long as θ > φ
1−φ , the reduction in capital intensity depresses real wages,
contributing towards a reduction in N . This is the novel general-equilibrium effect due to
22Note that the specification of aggregate consumption considered in Campbell and Mankiw coincides
with the one implied by our model. Therefore, if one were to run their regression on data generated by our
model, one would correctly identify the fraction of aggregate consumption accounted for by hand-to-mouth
workers in our model. This implies that it is indeed appropriate to calibrate our model’s relevant parameter
to Campbell and Mankiw’s estimate.
23This is true as long as the steady state is unique, which seems to be the case but has not been proved
as in the benchmark model. Also, in the variant with hand-to-mouth agents, we have to be cautious to
interpret φ as the ratio of private equity to effective wealth for the investor population alone.
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incomplete markets. The overall effect of government spending on aggregate employment is
therefore ambiguous under incomplete markets, whereas it is unambiguously positive under
complete markets.
Other things equal, we expect the negative general-equilibrium effect to dominate, thus
leading to a reduction in long-run employment after a permanent increase in government
spending, if the wage elasticity of labor supply is sufficiently high relative to its income
elasticity. This is clear in the GHH specification, where the wealth effect is zero. It can also
be verified for the case of hand-to-mouth workers, where we have freedom in choosing these
elasticities, but not in the case of KPR preferences, where both elasticities are restricted to
equal one.
Given these theoretical ambiguities, we now seek to get a sense of empirically plausible
quantitative effects. As already discussed, the GHH case (zero wealth effects on labor supply)
is merely of pedagogical value. We thus focus on the parameterized versions of the other
two cases, the economy with KPR (homothetic) preferences and the economy with hand-to-
mouth workers.
Table 3 then presents the marginal effects on the steady-state levels of the capital-labor
ratio, productivity, employment, and output for each of these two economies, as g increases
from 25% to 26%, or from 40% to 41%.24 The case of KPR preferences is indicated by KPR,
while the case with hand-to-mouth workers is indicated by HTM. In either case, complete
markets are indicated by CM and incomplete markets by IM.
K/N Y/N N Y τ kequiv
CM IM CM IM CM IM CM IM CM
g = 25%→ 26% KPR 0 −0.33 0 −0.12 1.4 1.27 1.4 1.15 0.52
HTM 0 −0.3 0 −0.11 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.46
g = 40%→ 41% KPR 0 −0.52 0 −0.19 1.76 1.53 1.76 1.34 0.68
HTM 0 −0.36 0 −0.13 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.44 0.48
Table 3. Long-run effects with endogenous labor.
Regardless of specification, the marginal effects of higher government spending on capital
24We henceforth focus on marginal rather than level effects just to economize on space.
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intensity K/N and labor productivity Y/N are negative under incomplete markets (and are
stronger the higher is g), whereas they are zero under complete markets. As for aggregate
employment N, the wealth effect of higher g turns out to dominate the effect of lower
wages under incomplete markets, so that N increases with higher g under either complete
or incomplete markets. However, the employment stimulus is weaker under incomplete
markets, especially in the economy with hand-to-mouth workers. The same is true for
aggregate output: it increases under either incomplete or complete markets, but less so
under incomplete markets. Finally, the incomplete-markets effects are on average equivalent
to what would have been the effect of increasing the tax rate on capital income by about
0.55% under complete markets.
7 Dynamic responses
The results so far indicate that the long-run effects of government consumption can be
significantly affected by incomplete risk sharing. We now examine how incomplete risk
sharing affects the entire impulse response of the economy to a fiscal shock.25
Starting from the steady state with g = 25%, we hit the economy with a permanent 1%
increase in government spending and trace its transition to the new steady state (the one
with g = 26%). We conduct this experiment for both the economy with KPR preferences and
the economy with hand-to-mouth workers, each parameterized as in the previous section; in
either case, the transitional dynamics reduce to a simple system of two first-order ODE’s in
(Kt, Ht) when θ = 1.26
25Note that the purpose of the quantitative exercises conducted here, and throughout the paper, is not to
assess the ability of the model to match the data. Rather, the purpose is to detect the potential quantitative
significance of the particular deviation we took from the standard neoclassical growth model.
26Throughout, we focus on permanent shocks. Clearly, transitory shocks have no impact in the long run.
As for their short-run impact, the difference between complete and incomplete markets is much smaller than
in the case of permanent shocks. This is simply because transitory shocks have very weak wealth effects
on investment as long as agents can freely borrow and lend over time, which is the case in our model. We
expect the difference between complete and incomplete markets to be larger once borrowing constraints are
added to the model, for then investment will be sensitive to changes in current disposable income even if
there is no change in present-value wealth.
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The results are presented in Figures 3 and 4. Time in years is on the horizontal axis,
while deviations of the macro variables from their respective initial values are on the vertical
axis. The interest rate and the investment rate are in simple differences, the rest of the
variables are in log differences. The solid lines indicate incomplete markets, the dashed lines
indicate complete markets.
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Figure 3. Dynamic responses to a permanent shock with KPR preferences.
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Figure 4. Dynamic responses to a permanent shock with hand-to-mouth agents.
As evident in these figures, the quantitative effects of a permanent fiscal shock can be
quite different between complete and incomplete markets. The overall picture that emerges
is that the employment and output stimulus of a permanent increase in government spending
is weaker under incomplete markets than under complete markets. And whereas we already
knew this for the long-run response of the economy, now we see that the same is true for its
short-run response.
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This picture holds for both the economy with KPR preferences and the one with hand-
to-mouth workers. But there are also some interesting differences between the two. The
mitigating effect of incomplete markets on the employment and output stimulus of govern-
ment spending is much stronger in the economy with hand-to-mouth workers. As a result,
whereas the short-run effects of higher government spending on the investment rate and the
interest are positive under complete markets in both economies, and whereas these effects
remain positive under incomplete markets in the economy with KPR preferences, they turn
negative under incomplete markets in the economy with hand-to-mouth workers.
To understand this result, consider for a moment the benchmark model, where there
are no hand-to-mouth workers and labor supply is completely inelastic. Under complete
markets, a permanent change in government spending would be absorbed one-to-one in
private consumption, leaving investment and interest rates completely unaffected in both
the short- and the long-run. Under incomplete markets, instead, investment and the interest
rate would fall on impact, as well as in the long run. Allowing labor supply to increase in
response to the fiscal shock ensures that investment and the interest rate jump upwards under
complete markets. However, as long as the response of labor supply is weak enough, the
response of investment and the interest rate can remain negative under incomplete markets.
As a final point of interest, we calculate the welfare cost, in terms of consumption equiv-
alent, associated with a permanent 1% increase in government spending. Under complete
markets, welfare drops by 0.2%, whereas under incomplete markets it drops by 0.6%. In
other words, the welfare cost of an increase in government spending is three times higher
under incomplete markets than under complete markets.27
To recap, the quantitative results indicate that a modest level of idiosyncratic investment
risk can have a non-trivial impact on previously reported quantitative evaluations of fiscal
policy. Note in particular that our quantitative economy with KPR preferences is directly
comparable to two classics in the related literature, Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Baxter and King (1993). Therefore, further investigating the macroeconomic
27Here we have assumed that government consumption has no welfare benefit, but this should not be taken
literally: nothing changes if Gt enters separably in the utility of agents.
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effects of fiscal shocks in richer quantitative models with financial frictions appears to be a
promising direction for future research.
8 Conclusion
This paper revisited the macroeconomic effects of government consumption within a tractable
incomplete-markets variant of the neoclassical growth model. Because private investment is
subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and because risk-taking is sensitive to wealth, the
aggregate level of investment depends on the aggregate level of net-of-taxes household wealth
for any given prices. It follows that an increase in government spending can crowd-out pri-
vate investment simply by reducing household net worth. As a result, market incompleteness
can seriously upset the supply-side effects of fiscal shocks: an increase in government con-
sumption, even if financed with lump-sum taxation, tends to reduce capital intensity, labor
productivity, and wages in both the short-run and the long-run. For plausible parameteri-
zations of the model, these results appear to have not only qualitative, but also quantitative
content.
These results might, or might not, be bad news for the ability of the neoclassical paradigm
to explain the available evidence regarding the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks.28
However, the goal of this paper was not to study whether our model could match the data.
Rather, the goal was to identify an important mechanism through which incomplete markets
modify the response of the economy to fiscal shocks: wealth effects on investment.
In our model, these wealth effects originated from uninsured idiosyncratic investment
risk combined with diminishing absolute risk aversion. Borrowing constraints could lead to
similar sensitivity of investment to wealth (or cash flow).29 Also, this mechanism need not
depend on whether prices are flexible (as in the neoclassical paradigm) or sticky (as in the
28Whether the evidence is consistent with the neoclassical paradigm is still debatable. For example, using
structural VARs with different identification assumptions, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Ramey (2006) find
that private consumption falls in response to a positive shock to government consumption, as predicted by
the neoclassical paradigm, while Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2007) find the opposite result.
29On this point, see Challe and Ragot (2007).
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Keynesian paradigm). The key insights of this paper are thus clearly more general than the
specific model we employed—but the quantitative importance of these insights within richer
models of the macroeconomy is, of course, a widely open question.
An important aspect left outside our analysis is the optimal financing of government ex-
penditures. In this paper, we assumed that the increase in government spending is financed
with lump-sum taxation, only because we wished to isolate wealth effects from the distor-
tionary and redistributive effects of taxation. Suppose, however, that the government has
access to two tax instruments, a lump-sun tax and a proportional income tax.30 Clearly,
with complete markets (and no inequality) it would be optimal to finance any exogenous
increase in government spending with only lump-sum taxes. With incomplete markets, how-
ever, it is likely that an increase in government spending is financed with a mixture of both
instruments: while using only the lump-sum tax would disproportionately affect the utility
of poor agents, using both instruments permits the government to trade off less efficiency
for more equality. Further exploring these issues, and the nature of optimal taxation for the
class of economies we have studied here, is left for future research.
30As in Werning (2007), this might be a good proxy for more general non-linear tax schemes.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (individual policy rules). Let J(w, t) denote the value function
for the household’s problem. The value function depends on time t because of discounting
as well as because the price sequence {ωt, Rt}t∈[0,∞) need not be stationary. However, the
value function does not depend on i, because households have identical preferences, they
have access to the same technology, and they face the same sequence of prices and the same
stochastic process for idiosyncratic risk. The Bellman equation that characterizes the value
function is given by:
0 = maxm,φ
{
z(mw, J(w, t)) + ∂J
∂t
(w, t) + ∂J
∂w
(w, t)[φr¯t + (1− φ)Rt −m]w
+1
2
∂2J
∂w2
(w, t)φ2w2σ2
}
.
(24)
The first term of the Bellman equation (24) captures utility from current-period consumption;
the second term takes care of discounting and the non-stationarity in prices; the third term
captures the impact of the mean growth in wealth; and the last term (Itô’s term) captures
the impact of risk.
Because of the CRRA/CEIS specification of preferences, an educated guess is that there
exists a deterministic process Bt such that:
J (w, t) = Bt
w1−γ
1− γ . (25)
Because of the homogeneity of J in w, the Bellman equation then reduces to the following:
0 = max
m,φ
{
z(m, J(1, t)) + ∂J
∂t
(1, t) + ∂J
∂w
(1, t)[φr¯t + (1− φ)Rt −m] + 12 ∂
2J
∂w2
(1, t)φ2σ2
}
. (26)
It follows that the optimal m and φ are independent of w. Using (5) and (25), the above
becomes
0 = max
m,φ
{
β
1− 1/θ [B
1/θ−1
1−γ
t m
1−1/θ − 1] + B˙t/Bt
1− γ + [φr¯t + (1− φ)Rt −m]−
1
2
γφ2σ2
}
. (27)
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The first order conditions for φ and m give the following:
φt =
r¯t −Rt
γσ2
, (28)
mt = β
θB
1−θ
1−γ
t . (29)
Substituting this into (27), using the definition of ρˆt, and rearranging, we get
0 =
βθB
1−θ
1−γ
t − θβ
θ − 1 +
B˙t/Bt
1− γ + ρˆt.
This ODE, together with the relevant transversality condition, determines the process for
Bt. Using (29), this is equivalent to the following:
.
mt
mt
= mt + (θ − 1)ρˆt − θβ,
which is the Euler condition (13).
Proof of Proposition 2 (equilibrium dynamics). Since aggregate labor demand
is
∫
i
nit = n¯(ωt)Kt and aggregate labor supply is 1, the labor market clears if and only if
n¯(ωt)Kt = 1. It follows that the equilibrium wage satisfies ωt = FL (Kt, 1) and, similarly, the
equilibrium mean return to capital satisfies r¯t = FK (Kt, 1) − δ. The bond market, on the
other hand, clears if and only if 0 = (1− φt)Wt +Ht. Combining this with Kt = φtWt gives
condition (17).
Combining the intertemporal government budget with the definition of human wealth,
we get
Ht = ht =
∫ ∞
t
e−
R s
t Rjdj(ωs −Gs)ds. (30)
Expressing this in recursive form gives condition (16).
Let ρ¯t ≡ φtr¯t + (1 − φt)Rt denote the mean return to total saving. Aggregating the
household budgets gives W˙t = ρ¯tWt−Ct. Combining this with (16) and with Kt +Ht = Wt,
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we get that K˙t = W˙t − H˙t = (ρ¯tWt − Ct) − (RtHt − ωt +Gt) . Using ρ¯tWt = r¯tφtWt +
Rt (1− φt)Wt = r¯tKt + RtHt, we get K˙t = r¯tKt + ωt − Ct − Gt. Together with the fact, in
equilibrium, r¯tKt + ωt = F (Kt, 1)− δKt, this gives condition (14), the resource constraint.
Finally, using Ct = mtWt, and therefore C˙t/Ct = m˙t/mt + W˙t/Wt together with W˙t =
ρ¯tWt − Ct = (ρ¯t −mt)Wt and (13), gives condition (15), the aggregate Euler condition.
Proof of Proposition 3 (steady state). First, we derive the two equations character-
izing the steady state K and R. In steady state, the Euler condition gives
0 = θ (ρ¯− β)− (θ − 1) 1
2
γσ2φ2,
where
ρ¯ = R +
[f ′ (K)− δ −R]2
γσ2
and φ =
f ′ (K)− δ −R
γσ2
.
Combining and solving for f ′ (K) gives condition (19). Condition (20), on the other hand,
follows directly from (16) and (17).
Next, we prove existence and uniqueness of the steady state. Let µ(R) and φ (R) denote,
respectively, the risk premium and the fraction of effective wealth held in capital, when K
is given by (19):
µ(R) ≡
√
2θγσ2
1 + θ
(β −R) and φ(R) ≡
√
2θ
γσ2(1 + θ)
(β −R).
Note that µ′(R) < 0 and φ′(R) < 0. Next, let K (R) denote the solution to (19), or equiva-
lently
K(R) =
[
µ(R) + δ +R
α
] 1
α−1
. (31)
Finally, let
D(R; g) ≡ (1− α− g) K(R)
α−1
R
− 1− φ (R)
φ(R)
. (32)
Note that we have used ω = (1− α)Y, G = gY, and Y = f(K) = Kα, where α > 0, g ≥ 0,
and α+ g < 1. To establish existence and uniqueness of the steady state , it suffices to show
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that there exists a unique R that solves D(R; g) = 0.
Fix g henceforth, and consider the limits of D as R → 0+ and R → β−. Note that
µ(0) = (2θγσ
2
1+θ
β)1/2 is finite and hence both φ(0) and K(0) are finite. It follows that
lim
R→0+
D(R; g) = (1− α− g)K(0)α−1 lim
R→0+
1
R
− 1
φ(0)
+ 1 = +∞.
Furthermore, µ(β) = 0, implying φ (β) = 0 and K(β) = Kcompl ≡ (f ′)−1 (β) is finite. It
follows that
lim
R→β−
D(R; g) = (1− α− g)K(β)α−1 1
β
− lim
R→β−
1
φ(R)
+ 1 = −∞.
These properties, together with the continuity of D (R) in R, ensure the existence of an
R ∈ (0, β) such that D (R) = 0.
If we now show that D (R; g) is strictly decreasing in R, then we also have uniqueness.
To show this, note that, from (32),
∂D
∂R
= (1− α− g)K(R)
α−1
R2
[
(α− 1)RK
′(R)
K (R)
− 1
]
+
φ′(R)
φ (R)2
. (33)
Now note that
Kα−1 =
f ′ (K)
α
,
K ′
K
=
1
α− 1
µ′ + 1
f ′ (K)
, and
φ′
φ2
=
γσ2µ′
µ2
,
where we suppress the dependence of K, µ, and φ on R for notational simplicity. It follows
that
∂D
∂R
=
1− α− g
α
f ′ (K)
R2
[
R
µ′ + 1
f ′ (K)
− 1
]
+
γσ2µ′
µ2
=
=
1− α− g
α
Rµ′ +R− f ′ (K)
R2
+
γσ2µ′
µ2
.
Since µ′ (R) < 0 and R < f ′ (K (R)) for all R ∈ (0, β), we have that ∂D/∂R < 0 for all
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R ∈ (0, β), which completes the argument.
Proof of Proposition 4 (incomplete vs complete markets). Since W˙t = ρ¯tWt −
Ct = (ρ¯t −mt)Wt, wealth stationarity requires ρ¯ = m. Combining this with the Euler
equation (15) in steady state, we get
θ + 1
2
φ(f ′(K)− δ −R)− θ(β −R) = 0.
From this, and for steady-state capital to be lower than under complete markets, that is, for
f ′(K)− δ > β, it has to be the case that
θ + 1
2
φ(β −R)− θ(β −R) < 0,
which, since β −R > 0, gives θ > φ/(2− φ).
Lemma 1 (properties of curves K1 and K2). Let K1(R) and K2(R), R ∈ (0, β), be the
functions defined by solving, respectively, conditions (19) and (20) for K as a function of R,
and let MPK denote the inverse of the marginal-product-of-capital function.
(i) For any σ > 0, K1(R) satisfies the following properties: 0 < K1(R) < MPK(R)
for all R; MPK(R) − K1(R) is decreasing in R and vanishes as R → β; and, finally,
∂K1/∂R > 0 if and only if θ > φ1−φ , which in turn is true if and only if R is sufficiently high.
(ii) For any σ > 0, ∂K2/∂R < 0 always; K2(R) → +∞ as R → 0, K2(R) → 0 as
R→ β.
(iii) For any R ∈ (0, β), as σ → 0, K1(R) → MPK(R) and K2(R) → β. (That is,
the K1(R) curve converges to the MPK(R) curve, while the K2(R) curve converges to the
vertical line at R = β.)
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) From (19) it is clear that f ′(K)−δ = R under complete markets,
whereas f ′(K) − δ = R + µ(R) > R under incomplete markets. Hence, for any given R,
steady-stateK under incomplete markets is lower than under complete markets, which means
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that K1(R) lies below MPK(R) for every R. Since µ(R) =
√
2θγσ2 (β −R)/(1 + θ), it is
clear that µ(R), i.e. the distance between K1(R) andMPK(R), is decreasing in R, and that
it tends to zero as R→ β. Finally, recall that (19) is equivalent to
θ (ρ¯− β)− (θ − 1) γφ2σ2 = 0,
where ρ¯ = φ(f ′ (K)− δ) + (1− φ)R, and φ = (f ′ (K)− δ −R) /γσ2. Applying the implicit
function theorem, we get
∂K
∂R
∣∣∣∣
(19)
=
φ− θ(1− φ)
φ(θ + 1)
1
f ′′
,
which proves that
∂K1
∂R
< 0⇔ θ < φ
1− φ.
Since φ, and therefore φ/(1 − φ), is decreasing in R, it follows that θ is less likely to be
lower than the threshold when R is high enough. So for R sufficiently high, ∂K1/∂R > 0.
(ii) Using the fact that φ = (f ′(K) − δ − R)/γσ2, it is easy to see that K2(R) → +∞
as R → 0. Moreover, since both sides of (20) are zero as (R,K) → (β, 0), we have that
K2(R) → 0 for R → β. From (20), using φ = (f ′ (K)− δ −R) /γσ2, f ′ (K) = αKα−1, and
ω −G = (1− α− g)Kα, we get
∂K
∂R
∣∣∣∣
(20)
= − (1− α)
Kα−1
R2
+ γσ
2
µ2
(1−α)2
R
Kα−2 + γσ
2
µ2
(1− α) f ′
K
< 0,
which proves that ∂K2/∂R < 0 always. (ii) Follows from the above.
Proof of Proposition 5 (steady-state impact of government spending). From
(32), we have that ∂D/∂g < 0. Together with the property that ∂D/∂R < 0, this implies
that the steady-state R necessarily decreases with g. The impact of g on the steady-state
K then follows from the fact that K1 (R) , defined by (19), does not depend on g and is
increasing in R if and only if θ is higher than φ/ (1− φ) .
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